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ARTICLES
NOT DEAD YET1: HOW NEW YORK'S
FINNERTY DECISION SALVAGED THE
STOCK EXCHANGE SPECIALIST
J. SCOTT COLESANTI 2
INTRODUCTION/OVERTURE
For nearly 140 years, the Specialist system has primed the
gears of the "open outcry" trading model of the nation's stock ex-
changes. For at least half as long, regulators and others have
publicly questioned whether the liquidity and continuous trading
afforded by the model outweigh its apparent informational
asymmetries. In recent years, that criticism has crystallized into
unprecedented criminal action against overly-opportunistic Spe-
cialists.
1 In honor of the Specialist system's lengthy run near Broadway, the title and five sub-
sections of this Article borrow from the song list of the hit musical Spamalot. ERIC IDLE
ET AL., MONTY PYTHON'S SPAMALOT (Universal Classics Group 2005).
2 The author is a Special Professor at the Hofstra University School of Law, teaching
Securities Regulation and Broker-Dealer Regulation. All views expressed herein are
purely personal.
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While currently many factors are uniquely converging to raise
questions about the Specialist system's continued vitality, per-
haps none would more readily speed its demise than the crimi-
nalization of self-serving trading traditionally punished by rep-
rimand and monetary fine. To wit, successful prosecution of
individual Specialists engaging in profitable principal trading
halts not only continuing practices on the Stock Exchange Floor
but also brings ignominy to its overseers and subordinates as
well.
In 2007, a federal judge granted a rare judgment notwithstand-
ing a guilty verdict in a highly publicized criminal case charging
a New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Specialist with interposi-
tioning, or taking profitable trades for his firm while counter-
party customer orders were pending. 3 As shared brokerage house
communications were condemned and other new applications of
the securities fraud prohibition were subsequently attempted,
the Finnerty decision grew in import as emblematic of the judi-
cial brake on industry criminalization. Accordingly, this Article
seeks to place the court decision in perspective by highlighting
the history of the Specialist system (and criticism thereof), pro-
viding a detailed summary and analysis of the written opinion,
and offering the most immediate regulatory ramifications for
similar Specialist behavior in the future.
I. THE SPECIALIST SYSTEM: KNIGHTS OF THE BOUND TABLE
A. Legend and Lure
The NYSE Specialist system, which assigns an exchange mem-
ber firm with the tasks of providing agency order execution, by
matching buyers with sellers and filling principal trading execu-
tion to ensure liquidity, 4 is traced to the years 1871-1872.5 One
3 United States v. Finnerty, 474 F. Supp. 2d 530, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that al-
though the Government was able to illustrate that Finnerty engaged in interpositioning,
the Government was unable to provide evidence to show that Finnerty's actions misled,
defrauded or deceived his customers).
4 See JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, BARRON'S DICTIONARY OF FINANCE
AND INVESTMENT TERMS 578 (5th ed. 1998). "A specialist or SPECIALIST UNIT performs
two main functions: [E]xecuting LIMIT ORDERS on behalf of other exchange members
for a portion of the FLOOR BROKER'S commission, and buying or selling-sometimes
SELLING SHORT-for the specialist's own account to counteract temporary imbalances
in supply and demand and thus prevent wide swings in stock prices."
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story describes a broker whose broken leg limited him to one seat
on the Exchange Floor, from where he handled all orders in
Western Union stock. 6 The less ribald tale attributes the creation
of the position to the desire to depart from the ancient system of
stocks being auctioned off at "call times" throughout the day; to
provide for continuous trading, brokers simply stationed them-
selves at one central location throughout the trading day. 7
While authorities differ on the exact scope and nature of the
Specialist's duties-and the distinct compensation therefor-the
position is generally explained as entailing two separate trading
functions: first, executing limit orders on behalf of other ex-
change members, and in turn sharing in the commission; and
second, buying and selling in the Specialist's own accounts to off-
set order imbalances and adjust inventory8 [hereinafter, the
"Dual Roles"]. More colloquially, the Specialist is placed at the
vortex of trading information in return for providing the capital
necessary to keep listed stocks open for trading.
B. Front Row Seats
By the time of the New Deal,9 and, more specifically, the Sen-
ate hearing that would result in the adoption of the first two fed-
eral securities laws, 10 it had become manifestly clear that the
See George T. Simon & Kathryn M. Trkla, The Regulation of Specialists and Implica-
tions for the Future, 61 BUS. LAW 217, 357 (2005) (tracing the changing roles and func-
tions of specialists and evaluating the efficacy of specialist regulation).
6 See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 661 (Foundation Press 9th ed. 2006).
7 See NYSE.com, Timeline, http://www.nyse.com/about/history/timeline-18601899-
index.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2008) (stating the Exchange developed a new "system of
continuous trading" to promote "more liquid markets" by stationing brokers who deal in a
particular stock to a single location on the trading floor).
8 See DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 4, at 578 (defining "Specialist").
9 It was already generally accepted in 1934 that "there [were] serious abuses in connec-
tion with the work of specialists .... [T]here are inherent difficulties in the situation
where under normal circumstances the available orders are known to the specialist only."'
Nicholas Wolfson & Thomas A. Russo, The Stock Exchange Specialist: An Economic and
Legal Analysis, 1970 DUKE L.J. 707, 717 (1970) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1383, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 14-15 (1934)).
1o See Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, A Historical Introduction to the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 338 (1998)
(describing the significant role played by the Pecora hearings in the formulation of the
Securities Acts).
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Specialist enjoyed a uniquely profitable place in the market
arena:
The most damning practice uncovered was the activity of
specialists (those who made markets on the floor of the ex-
changes). Because of their central location and function,
specialists were able to control the flow of orders in a stock
and manipulate its price. The hearings showed that some
stocks on the exchanges had over a third of their volume
traded by their specialists for their own accounts. Thus the
specialists were in a privileged position to see prices before
executing for the public and would often act for themselves
before filling an order from the public being executed
through a floor broker.11
The inevitable Congressional response to the Great Depression
nonetheless avoided the drastic solution of splitting the Dual
Roles 12 and opted instead for conflict of interest limita-
tions/prohibitions aimed at the entire trading community (the
SEC effectively echoed this sentiment in refusing to advocate for
the bifurcation of the Specialist's principal and agency functions
in both 1936 and 1963). 13
Ultimately, the Securities Exchange Act of 193414 (the "Ex-
change Act") codified unrelated trading limitations, including a
ceiling for the extension of margin and a ban on company officials
selling their own shares "short."15 The sanctity of the agency re-
lationship between various Exchange Floor personnel and their
customers was cemented by Section 11(a), which made it unlaw-
ful for any member of a national securities exchange "to effect
any transaction on such exchange for its own account, the ac-
count of an associated person, or an account with respect to
which it or an associated person thereof exercises investment
11 CHARLES R. GEISST, WALL STREET: A HISTORY 213 (Oxford Univ. Press 2004) (1997).
12 See GEISST, supra note 11, at 254 ("The danger was that the new law would be too
radical, severely restraining the ability of the stock exchanges to function."). See GEISST,
supra note 11, at 234.
13 See ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA 117 (Simon and Schuster 1982) (noting
concern that bifurcation would "radically change the composition of the securities indus-
try.").
14 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 78a-78nn (2008).
15 A "short" sale is a strategy involving the sale of a security not owned in expectation of
a price decline. See DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 4, at 556.
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discretion." 16 The effectuating SEC Rule 11a-1 ("Regulation of
Floor Trading") clarified as follows:
No member of a national securities exchange, while on the
floor of such exchange, shall initiate, directly or indirectly,
any transaction in any security admitted to trading on
such exchange, for any account in which such member has
an interest, or for any such account with respect to which
such member has discretion as to the time of execution,
the choice of security to be bought or sold, the total amount
of any security to be bought or sold, or whether any such
transaction shall be one of purchase or sale.17
Specialists were expressly exempted from Rule lla-l's prohibi-
tion by lla-l(b).18
C. The Slowly Thickening Plot
In 1963, the Securities and Exchanges Commission ("SEC") re-
leased a special study of the markets, which concluded in rele-
vant part that many Specialists traded excessively in their own
accounts; 19 the study prompted SEC Rule llb-1, which called
upon the stock exchanges to adopt rules delineating the Special-
ists' roles. 20 In response thereto, the NYSE adopted Rule 104,
16 15 U.S.C.S. § 78k (2008).
17 17 C.F.R. § 240.11a-1 (2008).
18 The prohibition in Rule lla-1 does not apply to "[any transaction by a registered
specialist in a security in which he is so registered on such exchange." Id.
19 See COFFEE & SELIGMAN, supra note 6, at 662 (noting specialists trading for their
own accounts exceeded 29% of overall market trading).
20 Rule llb-1 reads in relevant part as follows: § 240.11b-1 Regulation of specialists.
(a)(1) The rules of a national securities exchange may permit a member of such exchange
to register as a specialist and to act as a dealer. (2) The rules of a national securities ex-
change permitting a member of such exchange to register as a specialist and to act as a
dealer shall include: (i) Adequate minimum capital requirements in view of the markets
for securities on such exchange; (ii) Requirements, as a condition of a specialist's registra-
tion, that a specialist engage in a course of dealings for his own account to assist in the
maintenance, so far as practicable, of a fair and orderly market, and that a finding by the
exchange of any substantial or continued failure by a specialist to engage in such a course
of dealings will result in the suspension or cancellation of such specialist's registration in
one or more of the securities in which such specialist is registered; (iii) Provisions restrict-
ing his dealings so far as practicable to those reasonably necessary to permit him to main-
tain a fair and orderly market or necessary to permit him to act as an odd-lot dealer; (iv)
Provisions stating the responsibilities of a specialist acting as a broker in securities in
which he is registered; and (v) Procedures to provide for the effective and systematic sur-
veillance of the activities of specialists. 17 C.F.R §240.1lb-1 (2006).
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which indirectly addresses, among other things, interpositioning
(described later herein) where it states the following:
Rule 104. Dealings by Specialists
(a) No specialist shall effect on the Exchange purchases
or sales of any security in which such specialist is regis-
tered, for any account in which he, his member organiza-
tion or any other member, allied member, or approved
person ... in such organization or officer or employee
thereof is directly or indirectly interested, unless such
dealings are reasonably necessary to permit such spe-
cialist to maintain a fair and orderly market, or to act as
an odd-lot dealer in such security. 21
The Rule codified the SEC's long-held belief of the Specialist's
coexistent "affirmative obligation" (i.e., his duty to trade as prin-
cipal to keep the markets continuous and stable) and "negative
obligation" (the duty to not trade excessively for his own accounts
while maintaining the markets). The NYSE subsequently
adopted Rule 92, which limits trading by Specialists and other
NYSE members when in possession of "knowledge of any particu-
lar unexecuted customer's order to buy (sell) such security which
could be executed at the same price."22
Despite the vaguely defined Dual Roles, occasional invective,
and competing obligations, the lure of profits apparently out-
paced the risks, as data consistently showed Specialists earning
significant returns on equity when trading both blue chips and
low-priced stocks. 23
D. Success, Dominance, and Blame
From the late 1960s forward, a sole Specialist was assigned to
each stock listed on the NYSE.24 Concurrently, it was known that
21 NYSE Rule 104 (2003).
22 NYSE Rule 92 (2003).
23 See COFFEE & SELIGMAN, supra note 6, at 661-62 (stating NYSE Specialists earned
an average of a 30% return on equity in 1999); see also Jay F. Coughenour & Lawrence E.
Harris, Specialist Profits and the Minimum Price Increment (2003), available at
http://www.usc.edulschoolsfbusiness/FBE/seminars/paperslF-1-9-
04 HARRIScoughenour.pdf (finding "high frequency trading profits" for NYSE Special-
ists handling low-priced stocks and stocks that regularly traded outside of their quote).
24 See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 337-38
[Vol. 23:1
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Specialists trading for their own account enjoyed consistent prof-
its. 25 Add to this menu the finite number of NYSE member firms
and the existence of NYSE Rule 390 (which, until its repeal in
2000, prohibited trading in NYSE issues by NYSE members in
the OTC market),26 and it was readily apparent that the Floor
Crowd (and the customers they represented) were for decades lit-
erally bound to the Specialist table serving a particular stock.
Not surprisingly, the Specialist often found himself singularly
blamed for unpredictable or complex exchange failures. On the
day of the Kennedy assassination, for example, Specialists were
cited for a 3% market loss prior to the Exchange's early close. 27
E. Countdown to Intermission
Historically, the SEC had developed a "hands off' approach to
regulating the Specialists. The 1950s saw that d6tente demise
upon the SEC preparation of the American Stock Exchange Re-
port, which publicized the "dominant role of the specialist."28
Later in 1972, an internal SEC study of three months of trading
days in 1970 concluded that Specialists were buying as the mar-
ket rose and selling as it dropped. 29
In 1975, Congress convened to contemplate sweeping revisions
to the Securities Laws.3 0 That effort ultimately yielded piecemeal
and/or exhortatory measures aimed most directly at the SEC's
authority to compel market structure. This led one former SEC
Commissioner to conclude (in hindsight) that the Commission's
(Northeastern Univ. Press, rev. ed. 1995) (contrasting this with the role of Specialists in
1933 when stocks were usually handled by multiple Specialists).
25 See LouIs Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATIONS § 7-A-2 (Aspen Publish-
ers 3d ed.) (2006) (setting forth 1966 study estimating Specialists dealing for their own
accounts were profitable over 80% of the time).
26 See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Rescind Exchange Rule 390, Ex-
change Act Release No. 42758, 2000 SEC LEXIS 1015, at *4 (May 5, 2000).
27 See GEISST, supra note 11, at 282 (leading to criticism of specialist system as out-
dated and unable to withstand crisis).
28 SELIGMAN, supra note 24, at 336 (stating that statutes, common law, and custom
placed tremendous trust in the hands of Specialists).
29 See id. at 343 (referencing Senate staff summary conducted from March 1 to June 30,
1970 which indicated that specialists were "net buyers" when market rose and "net sell-
ers" when it declined).
30 See Eric J. Pan, A European Solution to the Regulation of Cross-Border Markets, 2
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 133, 151 (2007) (attributing the 1975 amendments to the
increase in SEC control over exchanges and placement of "new obligations on exchanges
to regulate broker-dealers and market makers.").
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focus on "consumer protection," although designed to eliminate
"the monopoly profits of the stock exchange specialist," ulti-
mately led to the SEC's failure to meet its obligations. 31
Still, as late as 1981, some scholars continued defending the
Specialist, noting that his role involved risk to capital and, was
more often than not, passive in nature. 32 NYSE disciplinary ac-
tions against Specialist firms failing to honor their affirmative
obligations were somewhat rare, but always noteworthy. One
such decision from 1989 imposed a censure, a fine of $210,000,
and the reallocation of a stock from a member Specialist firm
based upon its failure to maintain an orderly market in violation
of NYSE Rule 104. 33 On appeal, an NYSE Board committee re-
duced the fine.34
A report authored by the SEC's Division of Market Regulation
after the October 1987 Crash faulted the Specialists (whose
ranks dropped precipitously from over three dozen during the
downturn) for unpredictable actions in maintaining order flow in
dropping markets:
While specialists, in the aggregate, performed satis-
factorily, there was a wide variation in individual spe-
cialist performance. In particular, a disturbing num-
ber of NYSE specialists on October 19 either were net
sellers or did not take substantial positions. This in-
consistent specialist performance deteriorated further
during the afternoon of October 19 and throughout
October 20...
In light of our findings, the Division believes that the
[American Stock Exchange] and the NYSE should ex-
amine carefully individual specialist performance dur-
31 See KARMEL, supra note 13, at 102-03 (stating Securities Acts Amendments of 1975
gave SEC extensive regulatory authority, irrespective of its purported purpose to protect
consumers).
32 See Norman S. Poser, Restructuring the Stock Market: A Critical Look at the SEC's
National Market System, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 884, 890 (1981) (suggesting that specialists
offset any imbalances in market by buying and offering to resell stock).
33 See NYSE, Inc., Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 89-61, 1989 NYSE Disc. Action
LEXIS 58, at *1, 11 (July 13, 1989) (reviewing the penalty consented to by the member
firm).
34 See NYSE, Inc., Appeal from Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 89-61 (Oct. 5, 1989),
available at http:/www.nyse.comregulation/1020656068674.html (modifying prior deci-
sion by providing censure, reduced fine, and reallocation of stock from member specialist
firm Morelli, Nick & Co.).
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ing the market break. In this connection, the Division
believes the [American Stock Exchange] and NYSE
must use their powers to reallocate stock pursuant to
their rules where they identify specialists that exhib-
ited a substantial or continued failure to maintain fair
and orderly markets. 35
The 1987 Report also concluded that about one-in-four Special-
ist firms followed its affirmative duty until its pockets were
empty on October 19th.36
The Specialist system got a boost, at least indirectly, from the
SEC's scathing 1996 report on the competing NASDAQ market
maker model, in which numerous unnamed NASDAQ market
makers were cited for volumes of trading violations and the
NASD 37 itself was cited for failing "over a period of time to con-
duct an appropriate inquiry" into anticompetitive arrangements
between the same.38 Concomitantly, some noted that the privi-
leged position of Specialist was regrettable, but happily limited
in number. 39
Overall, the consistent criticism from decade to decade seemed
to sound the same refrain: Specialists may trade too much for
their own accounts, but they remain the best means of operating
a continuous Floor-based market.
F. Changing the Guard?
For competitive and other reasons, noteworthy markets have
moved away from the open outcry market in the past thirty
35 Div. OF MKT. REGULATION, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET
BREAK xvii (Feb. 1988).
36 See id. at 4-49, 4-58 (stating that of the fifty-five specialists in the NYSE, by the end
of trading on October 19, 1987, thirteen specialists were left with "no buying power" on
account of their taking increased positions at least twice the normal size).
37 See Report Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Regard-
ing the NASD and the NASDAQ Market, Exchange Act Release No. 34-37542, 52 S.E.C.
882, 906 (Aug. 8, 1996) ("The [Commission] investigation revealed numerous [trading]
violations.., by Nasdaq market makers.").
38 Report Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Regarding
the NASD and the NASDAQ Market, Exchange Act Release No. 34-37542, 52 S.E.C. 882,
883 (Aug. 8, 1996) ("These practices by market makers directly harmed the Nasdaq mar-
ket, other market participants, and large and small investors;" at n. 6).
39 See DOUG HENWOOD, WALL STREET: How IT WORKS AND FOR WHOM 165 (Verso 1997)
("Even if they do have access to privileged information on which they can profitably trade,
specialists and corporate insiders are nonetheless a small class of investors.").
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years. In 1978, the Cincinnati Stock Exchange went electronic. 40
In 1986, in a series of moves termed "Big Bang," the centuries-
old London Stock Exchange abolished face-to-face trading in fa-
vor of transaction execution via computer and telephone. In
2006, the Chicago Stock Exchange abandoned the Specialist sys-
tem in favor of a "participant" model that now allows electronic
trading by approximately sixty "Institutional Broker Representa-
tives" or "Money Market Traders." In 2006, the NYSE-the Spe-
cialist system's progenitor-both restructured as a for-profit cor-
poration and converted to a trading system that combines Floor
transactions, with electronic entry/execution of large orders (the
"Hybrid Market"). 41
The question thus arises, in a decade largely characterized by a
Bull Market, what precipitated this aversion to the model? Two
instances of SEC intervention on the NYSE Floor in the past
decade perhaps most readily explain the current intense scrutiny
of the Specialist system.
II. THE PRESSURES OF RECENT YEARS: TWICE IN EVERY SHOW
The warning shot for government maintenance of trading Floor
integrity might possibly have been an SEC release of June 1999,
which censured the NYSE for inadequate supervision of the ac-
tivities of a group of independent "$2 brokers."42 Eight of these
Floor players had been indicted for Section 11 violations prem-
ised upon their sharing in customer accounts. Noting that the
NYSE had failed to detect the wrongdoing, the SEC bluntly
stated the following:
The NYSE failed to dedicate sufficient resources to al-
low the regulatory staff responsible for Routine Inde-
pendent Member Surveillance to perform both random
and for-cause reviews simultaneously .... Although
random selection was not designed to detect or iden-
40 See Corinne Bronfman, Kenneth Lehn & Robert A. Schwartz, The SEC's Market 2000
Report, 19 J. CORP. L. 523, 523 n.2, 524 (1994) (noting several factors affecting "the
change in industry structure, including the increased importance of institutional inves-
tors, the development of new trading strategies, and technological innovations in the trad-
ing of financial assets.").
41 Exchange Act Release No. 34-52954 (Dec. 14, 2005), available at www.sec.gov/rules/
sro/nyse/34-52954.pdf.
42 See, e.g., Levine v. SEC, 407 F.3d 178, 180 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that independent
floor brokers are commonly referred to as a "two-dollar brokers").
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tify profit-sharing arrangements, had the Exchange
deployed additional resources to maintain random
surveillance while also conducting for-cause reviews,
it would have created an additional deterrent effect by
heightening the presence of NYSE officials in policing
floor activities.., which might have led to the discov-
ery of illegal trading schemes.43
Meanwhile, industry criticism grew in intensity. By 2002,
former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt bluntly summarized the
Specialist's role in his short treatise on investor protection:
Specialists are in business for themselves, and they of-
ten buy and sell shares for their own accounts. Unlike
other types of auctioneers, the specialist is allowed to
bid for shares while conducting the auction. If you
think a specialist's ability to see incoming orders gives
him a built-in advantage when trading for himself,
you're right. It's like being in a card game in which
only one of the players gets to see everyone else's
hand. exploit that advantage, too: in late 2001, they
were accounting for about 32 percent of all the shares
traded.44
To be sure, the import of this pejorative description cannot be
overstated: here was the Chair with the longest tenure in the his-
tory of the Commission (and a former stock exchange chairman
himself) advising the public that the knights who have long kept
the game going have an insurmountable lead in the tilt.
A. The Damaging Reviews
That insurmountable lead may or may not have galvanized the
public, but it certainly did not avoid SEC scrutiny. In October
2003, The Wall Street Journal loosed shock waves by reporting
that the SEC had forwarded to the NYSE a confidential report
decrying Specialist practices. The report was said to have de-
tailed trading tactics coined "trading ahead" and interposition-
ing, leading to profits to the top five Specialist firms of over $155
43 In re New York Stock Exchange, Exchange Act Release No. 41574, 70 SEC Docket
106 (June 29, 1999) (emphasis added).
44 ARTHUR LEVITT & PAULA DWYER, TAKE ON THE STREET: WHAT WALL STREET AND
CORPORATE AMERICA DON'T WANT YOU TO KNOW 179 (Pantheon Books 2002).
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million between 2000 and 2002. 45 While such critical oversight
might have escaped the journalistic eye in quieter times, follow-
ing a period during which the NYSE Chairman resigned and
former NYSE Board member Martha Stewart was indicted, the
scrutiny of Exchange Floor trading practices resounded in the
press. 46 Within months, NYSE investigators and their SEC coun-
terparts effected unprecedented discipline against all NYSE Spe-
cialist firms.
As an example, in March 2004, the SEC entered into a cease-
and-desist order with Fleet Specialist, Inc. ("FSI"), the registered
Specialist for approximately 430 NYSE issues and one of seven
such NYSE Floor firms at the time.47 FSI consented to violations
of SEC Rules llb-1 and 10b-5 between 1999 and 2003 through
"unlawful proprietary trading."48 The trading practices in issue
were described as "interpositioning" (e. g., filling a customer sell
order with a trade with the firm account, and in turn filling a
separate customer buy order from the same account) and "trad-
ing ahead" (e.g., purchasing/selling stock for a proprietary ac-
count before a customer can grab the same opportunity). The
wrongful interpositioning was said to have caused a customer
disadvantage of over $38 million, while the trading ahead was
described as resulting in a customer disadvantage of over $26
million. 49
The 2004 settlement explained the Dual Roles, listed specific
stocks, detailed certain improper transactions and divided
wronged customers into two camps: electronically entered "DOT"
["Designated Order Turnaround"] orders, and "Crowd" orders. In
concluding that FSI had violated "its basic obligation to serve
45 See Greg Farrell, NYSE Feels SEC's Sting, USA TODAY, Nov. 4, 2003, at 3B (describ-
ing trading ahead as "buying or selling stock on [the firm's] own account at an attractive
price before a customer moves on the same opportunity" and interpositioning as buying
stock at a price that is slightly higher than the current bidder's and selling to the first
available bidder instead of letting buyer and seller come together).
46 See id. ('The cracks in the walls of the New York Stock Exchange keep getting big-
ger."); see also Gary Weiss, This Watchdog Is On The Way Out, BUS. WK., Dec. 1, 2003, at
106 ("Under [NYSE Executive Edward] Kwalwasser, securities lawyers and institutional
investors have complained, the exchange's enforcement division had a relaxed culture and
tended to focus on minor infractions while overlooking systemic violations on the trading
floor.").
47 See In re Fleet Specialist, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 49499, 2004 SEC LEXIS
744, at *3 (Mar. 30, 2004).
48 See id. at *3-7.
49 See id. at *8-12.
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public customer orders over its own proprietary interests," the
SEC was blunt and concise:
As a specialist firm on the NYSE, FSI had a general
duty to match executable public customer or "agency"
buy and sell orders and not to fill customer orders
through trades from the firm's own account when
those customer orders could be matched with other
customer orders.
By effecting proprietary transactions that were not
part of a course of dealings reasonably necessary to
maintain a fair and orderly market, FSI violated Sec-
tion 11(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule llb-1 there-
under. In addition, with certain transactions in six
particular stocks, certain specialists at FSI engaged in
unlawful proprietary trades with scienter, violating
their implied representations to public customers that
they were limiting dealer transactions to those rea-
sonably necessary to maintain a fair and orderly mar-
ket. In those instances, individual specialists at FSI
violated Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule
10b-5 thereunder. 50
The SEC thus concluded that a "fair market" is, by definition,
free of such self-dealing as interpositioning, which was indirectly
termed a "manipulative and deceptive practice." 51 In turn, an
"orderly market" is "characterized by regular, reliable operation,
with price continuity and depth, in which price movements are
accompanied by appropriate volume, and unreasonable price
variations between sales are avoided" and, most importantly,
achieved through only necessary transactions. 52
Apart from citing the presence of the pleading element of sci-
enter, the SEC settlement addressed the Rule 10b-5 violations
only by generically linking them to the famed prohibition's three
disjunctive provisions: artifice to defraud, misleading statements,
and course of business fraud.53 Strikingly (at least in hindsight),
50 Id. at *3-4 (emphasis added).
51 Id. at *4, 10 ("A 'fair' market is free from manipulative and deceptive practices, and
affords no undue advantage to any participant . . . . Interpositioning disadvantages a
market buy order (i.e., a purchaser) and/or a market sell order (i.e., a seller)").
52 Id. at *4-5.
63 Id. at *23.
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the SEC concluded that the Specialist always makes representa-
tions to the public, albeit of an implied nature.54
FSI was also found to have violated §15 of the Exchange Act
(through its failure to supervise), as well as other NYSE rules
addressing supervision, good business practices, and/or Specialist
duties. The Specialist firm consented to a censure, a report by an
outside consultant, and related undertakings. The total dis-
gorgement charged to FSI was set at over $38 million and the
corresponding civil penalty pegged in excess of $21 million; both
payments by FSI were made in satisfaction of payments ordered
by a contemporaneous NYSE proceeding.55
By late July 2004, all seven NYSE Specialist firms had been
subject to joint NYSE-SEC actions premised upon violations of
SEC Rules llb-1 and 10b-5. Pursuant to those administrative
settlements, over $247 million in disgorgement and civil penal-
ties was recovered by the Commission.56 The two separate SEC
press releases describing the settlements, while highlighting the
lack of "reasonable systems or procedures to monitor, detect, or
prevent those violations," each also pointed out that the wrongful
54 Likewise, the "public misrepresentation" theory has been strengthened by develop-
ments in class action litigation involving Specialists. Specifically, in September 2007, an
appellate court, in upholding a portion of a lawsuit against the NYSE for its alleged fail-
ure to police its Specialists during the years discussed herein, held that precedent did not
preclude allegations of misrepresentations by a non-issuer. See In Re NYSE Specialists
Securities Litigation, 503 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 2007).
55 Id. at 32-33.
56 See Press Release, SEC, Settlement Reached with Five Specialist Firms for Violating
Federal Securities Laws and NYSE Regulations (Mar. 30, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2004-42.htm; Press Release, SEC, Settlement Reached with Two Specialist Firms
for Violating Federal Securities Laws and NYSE Regulations (July 26, 2004),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-99.htm; see also NYSE LLC, Hearing Board Decision
07-055 (Apr. 25, 2007), available at http://www.nyse.comlpdfs/07-055.pdf (explaining in-
dicted Specialist's violations of SEC Rule 10b-5 and NYSE Rules 104 and others, imposing
a censure and a permanent bar from the securities industry); see generally In re American
Stock Exchange LLC, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 55507, 2007 SEC
LEXIS 535, at *15-16 (Mar. 22, 2007) ("In several instances, the Amex excused what ap-
pear to be clear violations, such as when a specialist traded for his or her account at a bet-
ter price than the specialist's account received."); Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges
American Stock Exchange & Former Chairman & CEO Salvatore Sodano with Failing to
Exercise Regulatory Oversight Responsibilities (Mar. 22, 2007), http://sec.gov/news/press/
2007/2007-51.htm (revealing in an unprecedented move, the SEC brought charges against
the former Amex CEO, alleging his failure "to enforce compliance with federal securities
laws and exchange rules by Amex members").
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interpositioning activities "were heavily concentrated in a few
stocks overseen by a small number of specialists at each firm."57
On a related note, in April 2005, the SEC censured and disci-
plined the NYSE for "failing to police Specialists" between 1999
and 2003, noting that the failure followed "on the heels of a regu-
latory failure by the NYSE in the late 1990s involving independ-
ent floor brokers."58 The consensual settlement provided for the
Exchange's retention of a regulatory auditor to conduct audits of
its regulatory program through 2011 as well as the implementa-
tion of an eighteen-month pilot audio and video surveillance sys-
tem to surveil Specialists.5 9
To be sure, the second federal government discipline of mem-
bers of the NYSE Floor community in five years shone the spot-
light on the nation's oldest exchange. Moreover, the need for the
federal government to twice intervene no doubt prompted the
unprecedented fines. But conclusions of violations of technical
trading limitations by faceless entities-albeit accompanied by
eye-catching fines-do not alter or foretell the end of a suspect
trading model. In order to either effect widespread change in the
Specialist system or permanently alter it altogether, some of its
players would have to be identified and prosecuted. And such
successful prosecution often sounds the death knell for financial
institutions.
III. THE FINNERTY CASE: YOU WON'T SUCCEED ON BROADWAY
The "small number of specialists" cited in the SEC settlement
turned out to be fifteen, all of whom were indicted in April
2005.60 By the time of the Finnerty trial eighteen months later,
57 Press Release, SEC, Settlement Reached with Five Specialist Firms for Violating
Federal Securities Laws and NYSE Regulations (Mar. 30, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2004-42.htm; Press Release, SEC, Settlement Reached with Two Specialist Firms
for Violating Federal Securities Laws and NYSE Regulations (July 26, 2004),
http:/www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-99.htm.
58 See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges the New York Stock Exchange with Failing to
Police Specialists (Apr. 12, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-53.htm ("This fail-
ure by the NYSE to police trading ahead and interpositioning by specialists follows on the
heels of a regulatory failure by the NYSE in the late 1990s involving independent floor
brokers, which was addressed by the Commission in an order against the NYSE in June
1999.").
59 Id.
- See Jenny Anderson, Fifteen Specialists From Big Board Are Indicted, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 13, 2005, at Cl. The fifteen specialists indicted were members of the NYSE's five
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the government's record in interpositioning cases had been less
than stellar. The scorecard included two plea deals, two jury
convictions, two acquittals, and seven cases in which charges
were dropped. 61 By far the most noteworthy case to date-and
perhaps most illustrative-involves David Finnerty, whose case
yielded in turn, a jury finding of guilt, some hesitant closing re-
marks by the trial judge, and an ultimate (and rare) JNOV.62
A. Libretto
Finnerty had been indicted on three counts of securities fraud,
citing interpositioning and trading ahead in violation of Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated there-
under.63 After a loss in a separate criminal case against a Spe-
cialist from another firm, 64 the U.S. Attorneys amended their
Finnerty indictment on August 22, 2006 to eliminate the "trading
ahead" charge. That left interpositioning as the sole predicate for
the Finnerty's Rule 10b-5 violation. Upon subsequent considera-
tion of pre-trial motions, Judge Chin limited the government's
claims to sections (a) and (c) under Rule 10b-5 (i.e., allowing as-
sertions of employing "any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,"
as well as assertions that the defendant "engaged in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit," but not allegations of misrepresentation). 65
major specialist firms and were alleged to have reaped $13.4 million in illegal profits as a
result of interpositioning. Id.
61 See Paul Davies, Specialists Mark Rare Setback for U.S. Attorney-Decision to Drop
Remaining Cases Against Elite NYSE Floor Traders Follows Series of Miscalculations,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 2006, at C1. The dismissal of these criminal cases does not directly
impact related SEC or NYSE cases against Specialists or their firms. Id.
62 See Dick Thornburgh, Corporate, Criminality: Legal, Ethical, and Managerial Impli-
cation: The Dangers of Over-Criminalization and the Need for Real Reform: The Dilemma
of Artificial Entities and Artificial Crimes, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1279, 1284 (2007)
("[Judge Chin] took the rare step of overriding a jury's guilty verdict and granting a mo-
tion for judgment of acquittal . . . because the government failed to prove fraudulent or
deceptive conduct").
63 See Finnerty, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 536.
64 See Chad Bray, Ex-Van der Moolen Specialist Acquitted, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 18,
2006, available at http://www.boston.com/business/healthcare/articles/2006/09/l/
exvander_moolen_specialist_acquitted (announcing acquittal of former specialist for
making improper trades on firm's account).
65 See United States v. Finnerty, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72119, at *8-10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
2, 2006); see also In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 405 F. Supp. 2d 281, 317, 319
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). Interestingly, in the related class action civil litigation, Judge Robert
Sweet allowed the misrepresentation allegation as a means of satisfying Rule 10b-5. Id.
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At trial in October 2006, the government presented evidence
speaking to motive, means, and profit. Prosecutors adduced
three FSI clerks who testified to Finnerty's practices of trading
for the FSI account when pending customer orders could have
been matched. The government also presented the testimony of
the FSI's "primary financial officer," who testified to Finnerty's
compensation of salary plus an annual bonus based in part upon
the profitability of FSI's principal account.66
The government also introduced NYSE computer exception re-
ports identifying all of the allegedly interpositioned trades in
stocks assigned to Finnerty. These reports showed over 26,000
such trades between November 1999 and April 2003, resulting in
profits approximately 95% of the time and a total benefit to FSI's
principal account of $4.5 million.67 Additionally, the reports evi-
denced Finnerty's halting his practices on the day that FSI an-
nounced both internal and NYSE investigations into order "arbi-
trage."68 Finally, the prosecutors offered Finnerty's NYSE
investigative testimony, in which he acknowledged a duty to ob-
tain a price for the customer matching or exceeding the price ob-
tained by the Specialist, awareness of his "negative obligation,"
and knowledge that interpositioning violated NYSE rules and
FSI policy.69
In his defense, Finnerty offered one witness, an expert, who
testified that the number of instances of interpositioning offered
by the government represented "less than 1%" of the total num-
ber of trades executed by Finnerty as a Specialist during the
relevant time period.70
On October 26, 2006, after a two-week trial, Finnerty was con-
victed by the jury on all three counts.7 1 The press later noted
Judge Chin's displeasure with the verdict, quoting him as ac-
knowledging that there had been "some fuzziness in the law" ad-
vanced by the prosecutors 72 and that he believed the govern-
66 See Finnerty, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 533-35.
67 Id. at 534.
68 See id.
69 See id. at 534-35.
70 Id. at 535-36.
71 Id. at 532.
72 Paul Davies & Aaron Lucchetti, Moving the Market: Ex.Trader Found Guilty, but
Judge Questions Case, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2006, at C3 (stating that while Judge Chin
did not seek to reverse the verdict, his comments would likely strengthen any appeal or
reduce sentences).
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ment's numbers concerning interpositioned trades to be "clearly"
inflated. 73 Four months after the trial concluded, Judge Chin ap-
parently followed his instincts and reversed the verdict.7 4
B. The Curtain Call of February 2007
Judge Chin's written opinion neither excused nor whitewashed
Finnerty's behavior. In sum, while acknowledging that the de-
fendant profited on many occasions from self-dealing, the jurist
did not find the regulation defining securities fraud to be quite
elastic enough. In explaining his dismissal, the Judge divided
his ruling into four parts.
First, Judge Chin highlighted the rare occurrence of a reversal
of a jury verdict. Noting the "heavy burden" weighing on the de-
fendant seeking dismissal of a conviction by the trial judge,
Judge Chin nonetheless educated that the government "must do
more than introduce evidence at least as consistent with inno-
cence as with guilt."7 5
Second, the Judge provided a terse background on Rule 10b-5
and the requisite elements of a Rule 10b-5 violation. Citing to
two famed insider-trading precedents, 76 Judge Chin emphasized
the prohibition's focus on customer protection, concluding:
Thus, the very core of the federal securities laws in
question is the premise that there must be some form
of deception. If consumers are getting 'exactly what
they expect,' then the conduct is neither deceptive nor
fraudulent-and therefore not within the ambit of
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 .. .To convict under Rule 10b-
73 See Anna Driver, Ex-NYSE specialist found guilty of fraud, INS. NEWSCAST, Oct. 26,
2006, http://www.insurancebroadcasting.com/103106.htm (highlighting that Judge Chin
thought the government's allegation that Finnerty engaged in 26,000 illegal trades was
exaggerated).
74 See New York Judge Reverses Verdict Convicting Former Trading Specialist of Secu-
rities Fraud, 5-9 MEALEY'S EMERGING SEC. LITIG. 24 (2007) [hereinafter New York Judge
Reverses Verdict].
75 Finnerty, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 537 (quoting United States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364,
372 (2d Cir. 1991)).
76 See id. at 537 (citing to Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980) (de-
claring 10(b) a catchall fraud provision) and United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658




5(a) and (c) then, the Government must prove that a
defendant committed a deceptive act. 77
Third, Judge Chin focused on the defendant's petition for re-
versal (i.e., that interpositioning is not "deceptive"). Here, in the
heart of the Decision, Judge Chin engaged in a two-part analysis:
first, determining whether proof of customer expectations was
required for an interpositioning violation; and second, determin-
ing whether such proof had been presented by the government. 78
As to the first question, Judge Chin pointed out that it was the
government who had asserted in its opening statement that pub-
lic customers placing orders on stock exchanges expect the Spe-
cialist to try to "get them the best possible fair price" under the
circumstances, a point reiterated during summations. Accord-
ingly, the government itself had repeatedly recognized that
"proof of customer expectations was required to prove decep-
tion."79
Judge Chin clarified that the defendant was not arguing that
evidence of customer expectations "is an element of the crime
that the Government must establish for a conviction under Rule
10b-5," but rather, given the present facts, proof of interposition-
ing was not possible "without showing what the investing public
expected."80 The jurist lightened this load by adding that the ex-
pectation need not be proven by the actual testimony of custom-
ers; nonetheless, he stated, "[w]ithout evidence of what the cus-
tomers expected, no rational juror could conclude that the
interpositioning trades had a tendency to deceive or the power to
mislead."81
Having reasoned that proof of customer expectations was re-
quired for a conviction, the Judge next demonstrated that such
proof was lacking in the present case. He opined that Finnerty's
NYSE testimony did not rise to the level of establishing proof of
customer notice. 82 Next, he provided precedent for the conclusion
that an NYSE violation by itself does not equate with evidence of
77 Id. at 537-38 (quoting Chem. Bank v. Arthur Anderson Co., 726 F.2d 930, 943 (2d
Cir. 1984)).
78 See id. at 538-42.
79 Id. at 538.
80 Id. at 539.
81 Finnerty, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 540. 'To be clear, the Government is not required to call
public customers as witnesses to prove their actual expectations." Id.
82 See id. at 540-41.
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fraud.8 3 Finally, he posed a series of practical questions (e.g.,
"what did customers 'trust' the specialists to do?;" "or did custom-
ers know that the specialist was trading for his own account and
making a profit?") that had not been answered by the govern-
ment's case.8 4 "Some of the answers to these questions may be
obvious to those with knowledge of the industry, but none of
these questions were answered by the evidence presented at
trial," the Judge added.85
C. Rejected Scripts
Lastly, Judge Chin weighed the government's arguments for
upholding the convictions on alternate theories. A theory prem-
ised upon manipulation would fail for, again, the same lack of
proof of customer deception; moreover, the case for interposition-
ing as a violation akin to a broker charging an excessive commis-
sion was noted as having been precluded by his ruling on the pre-
trial motion to dismiss.86
Likewise, a case predicated upon findings of theft would consti-
tute securities fraud "only when it is accompanied by a violation
of a fiduciary duty."87 On this point, the Judge carefully can-
vassed judicial viewpoints on the existence of a Specialist's fidu-
ciary duty and ultimately denied its existence, most clearly in a
later section of the opinion decrying the government's analogy to
a real estate broker.8 8 Here Judge Chin came closest to equivo-
cating, initially proclaiming that "the only case to have squarely
addressed the issue" had concluded that Specialists do not owe a
fiduciary duty to their public customers,8 9 and then countering
that, regardless, the issue had not been briefed nor submitted to
the jury.90 In perhaps the most damning yet supportive comment
8 Id. at 541 (citing Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971)).
s4Id.
85 Finnerty, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 542. Judge Chin found that the customers were not de-
ceived because they were not aware of Finnerty's obligations, and because precedent pro-
vides that a NYSE violation, without more, does not constitute fraud. Id. at 540-42.
96 See id. at 542-43.
87 Id. at 543.
88 See id. at 547 ("The real estate broker has a fiduciary duty to the party he is repre-
senting, while the specialist does not.").
89 Id. at 543-44 (citing United States v. Hunt, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64887, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006)).
90 See id. at 543-44 (explaining that the issue was never submitted to the jury and
therefore not an issue at all).
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on Finnerty's behavior, Judge Chin concluded, "[b]ecause the
Government never demonstrated that defendant owed a fiduciary
duty to the public customers, the mere demonstration of theft is
insufficient to uphold the securities fraud conviction." 91
The opinion also made clear that profits, while speaking to mo-
tive, will not singularly establish a Rule 10b-5 violation. Specifi-
cally, Judge Chin reminded that "historically specialists have
made a profit in the overwhelming majority of their proprietary
trades" and concluded with the admonition that showing that the
defendant "was good at what he did and was well compensated
for his efforts was hardly compelling evidence that he engaged in
securities fraud."92
Finally, the decision reiterated its unequivocal two-part hold-
ing. Finnerty's conviction was overturned through judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. Moreover, Judge Chin held that if
the judgment of acquittal were later vacated or reversed, because
of the persistence of questions on common Specialist practices, a
new trial would be granted.93
D. Analysis/Audience View
In sum, the Finnerty decision at once eschewed criminal regu-
lation of an Exchange Trading Floor while affirming the exis-
tence of advantageous (if not carnivorous) trading behavior
thereon. While the prosecutors and judge seemingly were in ac-
cord on that behavior telling a tale of theft, the two ultimately
appeared at odds over some key lines in the script. For when the
government showed scienter, the Judge cited a lack of investor
harm.94 When the prosecutors displayed defendant's knowledge
of a duty, Judge Chin pointed to the investor's unawareness
thereof.95 And when the government highlighted profits, the ju-
rist discounted their import and questioned their breadth.96 On
one point the experienced judge saw no room for debate: Rule
10b-5 was not the answer.97
91 Id. at 543.
92 Finnerty, 474 F. Supp. 2d. at 544.
93 See notes 79-80 and accompanying text (noting ambiguity concerning common prac-
tices on the Stock Exchange Floor).
94 Finnerty, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 544.
95 Id. at 541 n.9.
96 Id. at 544.
97 See New York Judge Reverses Verdict, supra note 74.
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As decisive as the tone of the opinion was, the likelihood that
questions would abound:
. Is the Specialist the agent of the buyer or seller?
And who exactly is the customer-the institution that
entered the order, or its retail client? The Finnerty
decision-like the SEC settlement three years prior-
generically divided the category of "customers" into
those individuals who entered DOT orders and those
institutions that utilized Floor brokers without con-
comitantly clarifying whether different standards of
care attend dealings with each. 98 It would seem ra-
tional that a Floor trader customer has differing (and
more informed) expectations of Specialist practices
than does the retail customer sitting in his broker's of-
fice.
-What will constitute adequate proof of deception?
This is a particularly vexing query given that Fin-
nerty's own acknowledgement that "no order should be
disadvantaged in price" did not suffice. 99
- Generally speaking, at what point, if any, do Special-
ist profits overcome the vagaries of generic regulatory
limitations, such as Rule 10b-5, or even more specific
prohibitions, like NYSE Rule 92? While profits make
for a strong prima facie case of insider trading, 100 their
presence in interpositioning charges (which more often
than not are accompanied by the related "trading
ahead" violation 0 1), had been discounted.
Such considerations for the practitioner aside, the case re-
vealed equally daunting legal enigmas.
98 See Finnerty, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 532-33.
99 See id. at 545. In parallel class action litigation, plaintiffs alleged that the Specialists
made statements to customers about first being responsible to the market, and second to
their own portfolio. Id. at 540 n.7.
100 See, e.g., SEC v. Ginsburg, 362 F.3d 1292, 1299 (S.D. Fl. 2002) ("The larger and more
profitable the trades, and the closer in time the trader's exposure to the insider, the
stronger the inference that the trader was acting on the basis of inside information.").
101 See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges 14 in Wall Street Insider Trading Ring, (Mar.
1, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-28.htm (describing "trading ahead" as
a specialized form of insider trading committed by market professionals).
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E. Legal Plot Points
The Finnerty decision, which cited to cases both civil and
criminal, largely concurred with jurists recently confronting simi-
lar legal issues for Specialists. For example, like another South-
ern District of New York ruling in related criminal litigation,
Judge Chin dismissed the possibility of Rule 10b-5 misstatement
claim. 10 2 Moreover, like the holding in a separate but related
criminal case, 103 Judge Chin failed to find that Specialists owe a
fiduciary duty to their public customers. 04 Yet Judge Chin alone
found the regulation to be an insurmountable obstacle to a jury
verdict, and his resulting stamp on the Rule 10b-5 landscape re-
mains his emphasis on the requirement of customer deception for
purposes of finding securities fraud on an Exchange Trading
Floor.
That emphasis on Rule 10b-5's deception requirement is ripe
for debate. Judge Chin cited a string of cases standing for its ab-
solute need' 05 when he could have readily cited at least a few
cases to the contrary.10 6 It is axiomatic that such a pleading re-
102 See United States v. Bongiorno, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24830 at * 22-23 (S.D.N.Y.
May 1, 2006). The court dismissed Rule 10b-5 misstatement charges against seven NYSE
Specialists because the government's indictment had failed to allege material misstate-
ments or omissions. Id. But see In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 405 F. Supp. 2d at 319
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). The court found fraud on the market theory applicable in civil class ac-
tions, holding that "[pilaintiffs may be presumed to have relied upon information indicat-
ing that securities would be matched by specialists, as opposed to bought and sold at arti-
ficially high and low prices" in upholding misstatements claims. Id.
103 See United States v. Hunt, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64887 at *18 (holding specialists
do not owe a fiduciary duty to the public).
104 See Finnerty, 474 F. Supp. 2d. at 543 ("[T]heft constitutes securities fraud only when
it is accompanied by a violation of a fiduciary duty.").
105 See generally Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 338 (2005) (discussing un-
timely management disclosure of material facts in class action); SEC v. Zandford, 535
U.S. 813, 815 (2002) (illustrating a stock broker accused of theft from a client's account);
Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980) (describing a financial printer accused of insider trad-
ing); United States v. Russo, 74 F.3d 1383, 1385 (2d Cir. 1996) (examining alleged market
manipulation); Chem. Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1984)
(studying an accounting firm alleged to have prepared false and misleading financial
statements).
106 See, e.g., In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1433 (3d Cir.
1997) (holding voluntary and ultimately inaccurate disclosures by corporations do not
trigger Rule 10b-5 liability); Zlotnick v. Tie Communications, 836 F.2d 818, 823 (3d Cir.
1988) (noting that aggrieved market short sellers have been relying on the market price to
not indicate its true value); see also, Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 904 (9th Cir. 1975)
(declaring that Specialists trading in violation of exchange rules commit fraud on the
market).
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quirement has emerged as an afterthought to the Rule. 10 7 That
afterthought has been attenuated (if not altogether eradicated) in
cases alleging Internet manipulation, 108 insider trading, 10 9 and
corporate misstatements and mismanagement. 110 However, a re-
cent Southern District of New York case reinforced Judge Chin's
disdain for the singular premise of theft by dismissing an SEC
case against a foreign national who had allegedly obtained inside
information through his "hacking" into a firm's computer net-
work."'
To the same indeterminate end is the focus on the related
question of proof of customer expectations as a co-requisite to
theft for a finding of securities fraud. This question is intrinsi-
cally tied to the query of whether or not the Specialist is a fiduci-
ary. The cited and contemporary United States v. Hunt actually
considered the question of fiduciary duty in the context of sup-
porting a Rule 10b-5(b) charge (i.e., failure to dis-
close/misrepresentations)."12 Judge Batts concluded in Hunt that
the defendant, also an FSI Specialist accused of interposition-
ing,113 could not be found guilty under Rule 10b-5 on the allega-
tion of "failure to disclose" that his trading was violative of NYSE
rules.1 4 Additionally, Judge Batts both distinguished a "position
107 See JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 654 (Aspen Publishers 5th ed. 2006) ("From this per-
spective, contrary to the Supreme Court's teachings, neither a strict deception nor a sci-
enter requirement is implicit in the statute.").
108 See SEC v. Mandaci, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19143, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2004)
(granting summary judgment in favor of the Commission since proof of manipulation was
absent).
109 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 643 (finding fraud in defendant's "feigning fidelity" to his
employer law firm through silence).
110 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) ("Indeed, nearly every court that
has considered the proposition has concluded that where materially misleading state-
ments have been disseminated into an impersonal, well-developed market for securities,
the reliance of individual plaintiffs on the integrity of the market price may be pre-
sumed."); see also Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 217-18 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding Rule
10b-5 fraud present under "controlling influence" doctrine where defendant parent corpo-
ration convinced its subsidiary to issue stock and deceived plaintiff shareholders into re-
linquishing available New York State court relief).
"I SEC v. Dorozhko, SDNY Dkt. No. 07 Civ. 9606 (NRB) (Jan. 8, 2008).
112 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64887 at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006) ("While specialists may
have an obligation to maintain the market economy, they do not owe the public a fiduci-
ary duty, and therefore an alleged breach of fiduciary duty cannot serve as a basis for se-
curity fraud.").
113 Id. at 2, 6.
114 Id. at 12.
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of public trust" from a fiduciary duty and likened the Specialist
to a stockbroker not possessing discretion over a customer's ac-
count;115 such considerations were not emphasized by Judge
Chin's ruling.
More importantly, Judge Chin's reference to the stockbroker
analogy in Hunt is problematic. Specifically, Hunt's reliance
upon discretionary trading authority (or the lack thereof) as an
index of the broker's fiduciary duty to customers (and, in turn,
the duty to speak truthfully thereto) tells but part of the larger
debate. While it is relatively undisputed that a broker possess-
ing discretionary trading authority serves as fiduciary to his cus-
tomer, there are other ways for the broker-customer relationship
to reach that level of care. Indeed, a more traditional fiduciary
analysis might have focused on whether the trades were executed
by the Specialists as principal rather than as agent. As the lead-
ing treatise on securities regulation continues to remind, the
SEC (in part addressing the Dual Roles) professed a higher duty
of principals long ago:
If employed to sell securities a broker may not, with-
out complete disclosure to his customer, purchase such
securities for his own account; and if authorized to
purchase securities, he may not supply them from his
own account without such disclosure .... Where he
discloses to his customer that he is acting as dealer
and obtains the customer's consent, a broker may take
or supply for his own account securities named in a
brokerage order. 116
Under this form of analysis, since Judge Chin had accepted the
prosecutor's assertion that all Specialists profits result from in-
terpositioned trades executed on a principal basis,1 7 the Special-
ist, as principal, is obliged to disclose to his public customers that
he benefited from the interpositioned trade. In the Finnerty case,
such a burden would make conviction not only sustainable but
also likely. The trial burden would shift from the prosecutor (to
115 See id. at 14-15, 17.
116 LouIs Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION §8-A-3 n.39 (3d ed. 2006)
(quoting SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY AND
ADVISABILITY OF THE COMPLETE SEGREGATION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF DEALER AND
BROKER (1936)).
117 See Finnerty, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 544 (stating Government's assertion that only pur-
pose of interpositioning is to make money for specialist firm).
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prove a duty to speak) to the defense (to prove that adequate and
truthful disclosures were made). In such a scenario, evidence of
customer expectations becomes irrelevant, and dollars to the
Specialist's principal account serve not as evidence of scienter
but rather a measure of the harm.
Alternatively, under a more modern view, the Specialist as
agent broker would still arguably owe a fiduciary duty to the pub-
lic customer. 118 Of course, on the specific question of interposi-
tioning, the SEC has made clear in recent years that it holds the
Specialist to a fiduciary duty when acting as either principal or
agent;11 9 further, the NYSE, in enforcing its own Rules 104 and
92, has paraphrased but nonetheless echoed the call. 120
Finally, pursuant to industry rules, a Specialist, when interpo-
sitioning, would fail mightily as a stockbroker, the NASD rules
for which require best pricing for the retail customer at all times.
Significantly, NASD Rule 2320 states as follows:
Best Execution and Interpositioning
(a) In any transaction for or with a customer... a
member and persons associated with a member shall
use reasonable diligence to ascertain the best market
for the subject security and buy or sell in such market
so that the resultant price to the customer is as favor-
able as possible under prevailing market conditions.
... (f) The obligations described.., above exist not
118 See Mkt. St. Ltd. Partners v. Englander Cap. Corp., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8065
(S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1993). Institutional customer alleged, inter alia, breach of fiduciary
duty by the American Stock Exchange and certain of its Specialists. Id. at *31. The court
cited to a 1967 law review article for the premise that "[a]s broker, the specialist holds
and executes orders for the public on a commission basis. When he does so, he is an agent
and has a fiduciary obligation to his principal, the purchaser or seller of stock." Id. at *33.
Judge Chin mentioned Market Street in a footnote but found the case to be irrelevant, as
it had differing facts and had been held inapplicable by Judge Batts in Hunt because pub-
lic customers compensate brokers, but not Specialists. See Finnerty, 474 F. Supp. 2d at
544 n.10.
119 See In re Fleet Specialist, Inc., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 49499,
2004 SEC LEXIS 744 at *5 (Mar. 30, 2004). The proceeding involved violations of the re-
spondent's "basic obligation to serve public customer orders over its own proprietary in-
terests" and provided an overview of specialists' obligations. Id. at *4. According to the
administrative order, the specialist has two primary duties: executing customer orders at
the most advantageous price and offsetting imbalances in supply and demand. Id. at *5.
120 See NYSE LLC, Hearing Board Decision 07-055 (April 25, 2007), available at
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/07-055.pdf (concluding that respondent violated his agency ob-
ligations as a specialist).
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only where the member acts as agent for the account
of his customer but also where retail transactions are
executed as principal and contemporaneously offset.
121
By definition, an interpositioned trade confesses the existence
of a price more favorable than that which the customer received,
and the interpositioning "broker," when servicing a retail order,
is, save for certain instances, normally in violation.
Thus, the stockbroker analogy fails to resolve the fiduciary
question, triggers codified regulatory limitations, and supports
the present, unwavering SEC view of an inviolate duty (while
quite likely giving rise to the same misrepresentation cause of ac-
tion that Judge Chin twice denied the government). Moreover,
the Finnerty decision's reliance on the analogy is purely aca-
demic, as Judge Chin points out that the issue was never submit-
ted to the jury. 122
On balance, in the face of documented lapses in Trading Floor
supervision by the NYSE, prior administrative discipline against
the Specialist firms, a criminal enforcement program that had
been half abandoned by U.S. Attorneys, and an anonymous list of
victims, Judge Chin, having refused before trial to allow Rule
10b-5 to act as a catchall, refused afterwards to eliminate one of
its frequent (if not pivotal) requirements, namely, that an identi-
fiable party was victimized. 123 Stated otherwise, in the absence of
precedent, the judge may have simply been loathe to criminalize
Floor behavior that has existed for decades, 124 and the supple,
though often conflicted field of Rule 10b-5 holdings-along with a
trial that exhibited a few prosecutorial shortcuts and presump-
tions-amply provided grounds for the judge's reversal.
121 NASD Manual, Rule 2320: Best Execution and Interpositioning (2007), available at
http://finra.complinet.com/finra/display/display.html?rbid=1189&element-id=1159000466.
122 See Finnerty, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 541 ("As a consequence, the jury was required to
assume . .. that the customers knew about these rules and expected the specialists to
comply with them.").
123 See Case Highlights & Commentary, 2007 SEC. LIT. COMMENT. 2 (stating that the
defendant prevailed because the "Government failed to supply proof that investor decep-
tion was part and parcel of the scheme.").
124 See Gary Weiss, Can the Big Board Police Itself? 3654 BUS. WK. 154 (Nov. 8, 1999).
During the sentencing hearing for the eight Floor traders discussed earlier herein, testi-
mony from the head NYSE regulator had confirmed that "until October, 1998, the NYSE
felt it was not necessarily improper for a floor broker to share in the profits of someone
else's trading account."
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F. Factual Miscues
While procedural obstacles may have undermined the verdict,
it remains clear that a considerable part of Judge Chin's uneasi-
ness stemmed from the government's failure to expose the jury to
the realities of the Stock Exchange Floor. For example, in re-
peating his belief that the instances of interpositioning were
"clearly and significantly overstated," the Judge added that "it
appears that the Government failed to account for numerous cir-
cumstances when Finnerty was not executing trades himself-he
was not on the floor or he was not at his post or he was negotiat-
ing with the crowd or otherwise engaged in non-trading activ-
ity."125
Indeed, Judge Chin may have felt particularly shortchanged by
the government's lack of proof of customer deception in light of
his express pre-trial ruling-over the defendant's motion to dis-
miss-that the indictment set forth allegations that would consti-
tute securities fraud:
By taking positions as specialists, defendants were re-
quired - under the rules of the NYSE - to match or-
ders and to place the interests of their public custom-
ers above their own. Rather than abide by these rules,
defendants allegedly made a profit for themselves, and
subordinated the interests of the trading public below
their own. Accordingly, this scheme or course of busi-
ness worked to deceive the trading public, as investors
believed that defendants were working to match or-
ders, first and foremost, and that defendants traded
for their own proprietary accounts only to maintain a
fair and orderly market. If proven, then, these acts of
trading ahead and interpositioning would constitute a
violate of [Rule 10b-5] subsections (a) and (c).' 2 6
Having initially agreed with the government in October 2006
that Rule 10b-5 could withstand the expansion to Specialist self-
dealing, the Judge proceeded to set the parameters for the viola-
tion; the prosecutors' ensuing failure to adhere to that guidance
proved most fatal to their case. Tellingly, on the specific point of
the government's "inflated" instances of interpositioning, Judge
Chin explained the prosecutors' reversal of fortunes when he
125 Finnerty, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 546.
126 Finnerty, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72119 at *11.
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stated that he "could not assume that the Government would fail




The dismissal arguably revived the SEC's prior stances to-
wards Specialists; their conflicted roles are necessary evils and
their discipline is to be meted out by the parties at the stock ex-
changes who monitor their trading. Recall that even in the wake
of the 1987 Crash (and some documented Specialist inactivity
therein), the SEC response primarily exhorted the exchanges to
take disciplinary action and reallocate stocks among Special-
ists.128
The New York Times stated that Judge Chin's reversal was
"the latest blow to the pursuit of federal criminal charges against
15 New York Stock Exchange floor supervisors," adding that
"[p]rosecutors had already dropped [similar] charges against
seven defendants." 129 Similarly, The Wall Street Journal criti-
cized the decision as "the latest setback," quoting a spokeswoman
for the U.S. Attorney's office as saying "[w]e are reviewing the
opinion and considering our options."130 The law bloggers were
supportive (albeit more blunt), noting that the government had
offered "no proof that investors would have refused to trade if
they knew a middleman was involved."' 31
CONCLUSION: ALWAYS LOOK ON THE BRIGHT SIDE
The Specialist system has invited open and harsh criticism for
over seventy years. The SEC in particular has voiced its con-
127 Finnerty, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 546 n.12.
128 See Div. OF MKT. REGULATION, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, THE OCTOBER 1987
MARKET BREAK xvii (Feb. 1988) ("In light of our findings [regarding specialist perform-
ance during the market break period], the Division believes . .. [that] the Amex and
NYSE must use their powers to reallocate stock .. .where they identify specialists that
exhibited a substantial or continued failure...").
129 Associated Press, U.S. Judge Voids Guilty Verdict of Big Board Specialist in G.E.,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2007, at Cll.
130 Chad Bray & Paul Davies, Moving the Market: NYSE Ex-Floor Trader's Conviction
Is Thrown Out In Latest Blow to U.S., WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2007, at C2 (reporting how
government is having difficulty prosecuting "Specialists").
131 See Posting of Maria Leone to CFO Blog, http://www.cfo.com/blogs/index.cfm/detail/
8756850?f=search (Feb. 22, 2007, 15:44 EST) (summarizing defense attorneys' arguments
in Finnerty case).
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cerns over that span, but perhaps only with a string of criminal
indictments in the last few years did the system's continued util-
ity come simultaneously into both focus and peril.132
In the wake of the corporate scandals prompting the adoption
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,133 the White House formally
announced the President's Ten-Point plan to return corporate re-
sponsibility and "to improve oversight of corporate America;" that
plan included the credo that "each investor should have prompt
access to critical information" as well as the encouragement of
the Corporate Fraud Task Force within the Department of Jus-
tice to heed the "call to action" and further the goal of real-time
enforcement. 134 Yet, three weeks after the completion of the Fin-
nerty trial, the United States Attorney for the Southern District
of New York announced that, having assessed the evidence in its
Specialists cases, "the Government has concluded that continued
prosecution in these [five remaining Specialist] cases are not in
the interests of justice."' 35
Thus, in addition to quelling a part of the Task Force, by de-
clining to apply Rule 10b-5 to a case of sizeable Specialist profits,
the Finnerty decision of February 2007 dampened the death knell
for the Specialist system. Whether or not all American ex-
changes abandon the trading model will likely be decided by con-
siderations of execution speed, anonymous trading, globalization,
and institutional clout. 136 In light of Judge Chin's bold reversal of
a jury's conclusion on Specialist practices, the following conclu-
sions seem supportable:
The Finnerty decision signals a split between the courts and
the SEC on, among other things, the duties attending the Dual
Roles of the Specialists. Notably, Judge Chin cited a separate
132 See the Amicus Brief of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
submitted in Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 2006 U.S. Briefs
43, 45 ("The threat of a criminal indictment is a serious deterrent - because even an in-
dictment, and certainly a conviction, would amount to a professional death sentence.").
133 See generally Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud in Corporations,
N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2002, at Al.
134 See President's Ten-Point Plan, http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/corporate
responsibility/index2.html.
135 See Statement On Status of Five "Specialist" Cases, United States Attorney South-
ern District of New York (Nov. 21, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/
pressreleases/November06/specialiststatement.pdf.
136 In the Fall of 2007, the Boston Stock Exchange was acquired by the Nasdaq Stock




2006 Southern District of New York case for the proposition that
"specialists do not owe a fiduciary duty to their public custom-
ers,"137 while the SEC in recent years has affirmatively stated
"[w]hether acting as brokers or dealers, specialists are required
to hold the public's interest above their own . . . ."138 Indeed, it
seems patently clear that the Finnerty prosecutors, who were
cited for promising proof of customer expectations in their open-
ing remarks, can be said to have essentially been following the
script authored by the SEC's 2004 settlements.
Yet that split serves mainly to expose the weakness of the
SEC's zeal. The issue remains of how the regulators and regu-
lated alike may discern a dividing line between "reasonably nec-
essary" principal purchases by the Specialist and self-dealing
that falls outside of the catchall of 'failing to maintain an orderly
market.' Simply put, is ANY level of interpositioning acceptable,
or is the SEC desiring a zero tolerance policy?
As flexible as Rule 10b-5 may have been, jurists and other tri-
ers of fact do not appear ready to universally apply the industry's
most feared prohibition to all instances of noteworthy profiteer-
ing. Indeed, Rule 10b-5 may prove to be problematic as a pana-
cea in the new millennium as prosecutors attempt to criminalize
nuanced industry behavior.139 Apart from the defeats handed the
government (by both juries and a jurist) in the Specialist cases,
also in 2007 a federal jury acquitted six employees of a day trad-
ing firm accused of committing securities fraud by paying other
firms to listen in on internal "squawk box" transmissions in order
to trade ahead of large customer orders. In those cases, too, the
prosecution charged Rule 10b-5 as a criminal violation, and the
defense argued that no customers were harmed.1 40 On the related
topic of civil litigation, it bears noting that, in a three-month pe-
137 Finnerty, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 543 (contemplating cases opposed to fiduciary duty of
specialists).
138 In re Fleet Specialist, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 49499, 2004 SEC LEXIS 744 at
*6 (Mar. 30, 2004) (highlighting numerous obligations of specialists).
139 See Jenny Anderson, As Lenders, Hedge Funds Draw Insider Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 16, 2006, at Al (reporting SEC's investigation of possible insider trading based on
leaks from a private conference call between Movie Gallery and its lenders regarding the
poor state of the movie rental industry).
140 See Jenny Anderson, 6 Former Workers at a Day Trading Firm Are Acquitted, N.Y.
TIMES, May 11, 2007, at C2. A mistrial was granted on the conspiracy charge, giving the
government the opportunity to re-try that aspect of the case. Moreover, the SEC com-
plaint against the firm and the employees premised on the same behavior is still pending.
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riod last year, the Supreme Court raised the pleading bar for se-
curities class actions, 141 and the SEC itself entertained the idea
of mandatory arbitration for disputes between shareholders and
issuers. 142 Thus, the temperature proved far from hot for expand-
ing the reach of Rule 10b-5 (and its storied pleading require-
ments) into new and untapped areas of litigation.
Ironically, by dropping the "trading ahead" (i.e., insider trad-
ing) charge, the prosecutors may have unwittingly provided
Judge Chin with the means of dismissing the victory in applying
Rule 10b-5, for highlighted customer expectations would have
been irrelevant to a conviction based in part on an insider trad-
ing violation, which requires no specified victims. 143
The specific case for casting interpositioning as a Rule 10b-5
violation has been complicated by the now court-defined need to
present evidence to juries of the presence of a fiduciary duty, and
the evidence of someone being hoodwinked. 44 Of course, when-
ever forced to confront a new, technical practice, prosecutors are
charged with the duty of readily explaining customs and trading
practices to both judges and newcomers alike. Such a charge ap-
parently became daunting in the present case, the decision for
which clearly and repeatedly noted shortcomings through state-
ments such as "[t]he record is not clear, but it appears that the
specialist firms do not charge a commission or fee for their ser-
vice in matching trades,"' 45 and "[i]ndeed, the issue of whether
141 See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2513 (2007) (hold-
ing that plaintiffs in private securities fraud actions must plead with particularity the
facts giving rise to the alleged violation and the facts demonstrating a "strong inference"
of defendant's scienter).
142 See Kara Scannell, SEC Explores A Wider Role For Arbitration-Agency May Con-
sider Letting Firms Head Off Lawsuits by Investors, WALL ST. J., April 16, 2007, at Al
(describing the SEC's intention to expand the concept of mandatory arbitration as "limit-
ing shareholders' ability to sue in court").
143 It bears noting that in other applications of the prohibition to technical areas (e.g.,
internet fraud; insider trading), the federal judiciary and Congress have waived this re-
quirement. See, e.g., Mandaci, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19143, at *23. Under 17(a) of the
Securities Act, the SEC need not prove defendant's scienter in order to enjoin the party
from using a device to defraud in the offer or sale of securities in interstate commerce or
by the use of the mail. See also Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, §20A (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78t-l(a) (2007)). Section 20A of the Act establishes contemporaneous liability to
all market participants on the other side of the violating buyer or seller. Id.
144 See supra note 94.
145 Finnerty, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 544. Later on, Judge Chin amplified his disappointment
with the government's case: "I continue to have questions as to the process by which spe-
cialists dealt with customers, what customers expected, how specialists were compen-
sated, and how the specialist firms earned income." Id. at 545-46.
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Finnerty owed a fiduciary duty to the public customers was never
resolved."' 46
Concomitantly, internal exchange enforcement, despite the
trend towards merging and consolidating exchange regulatory
units,147remains more important than ever. 148 If Rule 10b-5's
pleading requirements prove too onerous, then marketplace-
trading rules such as NYSE Rule 104 will have to serve as the
primary deterrent to overly-opportunistic Specialist trading. 49
Such cases, with their ever-increasing fines and attendant noto-
riety, are much more likely than the SEC's suggestion of a forced
reshuffling of stocks assigned to Specialists. 50 Meaningful deter-
rence will surely be emphasized by those stock exchanges seeking
prolonged lives for specialist-centered trading models.151
The change in the past two years at the NYSE from 80% hu-
man trading to 80% electronic trading, whatever its primary mo-
tivation, has resounded the calls for a Big Bang on the west side
146 Id. at 543.
147 In January 2007, NASD members voted to approve the consolidation of the regula-
tory arms of the NYSE and NASD. Press Release, NASD, NASD Member Firms Embrace
Streamlined, More Efficient Regulation (Jan. 21, 2007), http://www.finra.org/PressRooml
NewsReleases/2007NewsReleases/PO18334. That merger of internal enforcement units
was formally approved by the SEC in July 2007. Press Release, SEC, SEC Gives Regula-
tory Approval for NASD and NYSE Consolidation (July 26, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2007/2007-151.htm.
148 See NYSE, Inc., Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 04-127 (Aug. 11, 2004), available
at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/04-127.pdf. Finnerty, who had given partial testimony to
NYSE investigators in August 2003, was censured and barred from NYSE membership
until such time as he fully cooperates. Id.
149 In late 2007 the NYSE formally altered the Specialist compensation structure, pro-
posing in separate releases to implement a revenue sharing program, eradicate Specialist
commissions, and implement a revised system of payments based upon the provision of
market liquidity. See SEC Release No. 34-56337 (Sept. 6, 2007) and SEC Release No. 34-
56591 (Oct. 9, 2007).
150 See Amber Anand, Sugato Chakravarty, & Chairat Chuwonganant, Cleaning House:
Stock Reassignments on the NYSE 1 AFA CHI. MEETINGS PAPER (Mar. 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=888574 ("Thus, even though the
NYSE follows an elaborate matching process of new listings with the 'right' specialist
firms, it rarely reallocates stocks.").
151 In addition to its highly publicized switch to a "Hybrid Market," the NYSE cut its
staff members by more than a third in 2006, while gradually closing two trading rooms of
its storied Floor. In May of 2007, one Floor member openly warned of automation hurry-
ing the Floor's extinction. See Luke Jeffs, NYSE Broker Warns Against Demise of Floor,
FIN. NEWS ONLINE US, May 21, 2007, available at http://www.financialnews-
us.com/index.cfm?page=usaboutus&uid=2807-1109-900619-781332. In October 2007, the
NYSE formally petitioned the SEC to redefine "Crowd" as the remaining rooms on the
storied Floor from which Floor brokers are able to conduct business. SEC Release No. 34-
56621 (Oct. 15, 2007).
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of the Atlantic. 152 Thus, while the Specialist system, to quote the
Broadway show Spamalot, is "not dead yet," its practitioners
might do well to refrain from inviting further prosecutorial scru-
tiny of over-participation in the market. One could say that this
select group should enjoy the privileged position tradition has af-
forded them, and-heeding another showstopper from the musi-
cal-look on the bright side of life, for as long as the market (and
the courts) keep the curtain from falling.
152 See Susan Harrigan, Big Board's Trade-off- Style is Yielding to Speed, NEWSDAY,
Mar. 19, 2007, at A34 ("Large customers' demands for faster and cheaper trading, as well
as brutal new competition from all-electronic markets, have revolutionized the way busi-
ness is done at the Big Board, the linchpin of the metropolitan's area's vast financial in-
dustry.").
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